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Suggesting a new explanation why Tacitus narrates the desertion of a German auxiliary 
cohort within the laudatory biography of his father-in-law, I will argue that in this work 
Tacitus exempliﬁes three basic ways of dealing with loss of freedom and thus explores the 
possibility to conceive both the rule of the Roman people over provicial subjects and of 
the emperor over the Roman elite as a form of empowerment in the service of a common 
cause. The Agricola displays the military sphere as a model for balancing the emperor’s 
claim for uncontested leadership and the senators’ claim for liberty, but also shows limits 
of this model. I present a literary reading with no pretence to revealing historical reality. 
The only aim is to point out possible signiﬁers of authorial intention in the Agricola.
In this, I build on Wolf Liebeschütz’s theses that “[...] there is a theme running through 
the whole of the Agricola: the consequences of the loss of liberty” and that it “is not treated 
from the same point of view throughout”1. Inspired by Liebeschütz, Myles Lavan analyses 
the theme of slavishness as an umbrella for “a shared set of polarities”, such as “passivity 
and action”2. Diﬀerent from Lavan, I will develop Liebeschütz’s original typology based 
on the passage (42.3-4) that expresses the essence of Agricola’s exemplarity. Tacitus dis-
tinguishes three diﬀerent types of senators. [1] The inert majority is subdued into servility 
by pressure and pleasure3, suﬀering humiliation under bad emperors and happier under 
good ones. [2] A few brave but vainglorious individuals, whom I will call ‘deﬁant sena-
tors’4, throw away their life in acts of impressive but futile resistance. [3] Agricola, a repre-
sentative of the third type, subordinates himself to the ruler and still achieves recognition 
for his service to the Roman state5. In addition to this now widely accepted tripartition, I 
claim that the three types of senators are mirrored by three types of non-Roman subjects. 
1 Liebeschütz 1966, 138.
2 Lavan 2011, 303.
3 Compare Lavan 2011, 298-300.
4 The terms ‘senatorial’ or ‘Stoic opposition’ would denote a somewhat organised group. Irrespective 
of the historical facts and what Tacitus writes in other works, the Agricola displays the individuality and 
isolation of that type and does not call attention to Stoicism.
5 Liebeschütz 1966, 127-132. 
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As the ﬁrst mirror type, the average provincials correspond to the anonymous majority of 
senators: after some resistance, they succumb, and then their fate depends on how they 
are ruled by their governor. The second type, which corresponds to the deﬁant senators, 
is instantiated by the Usipi, a cohort of newly recruited Germans, who kill the centurion 
and legionaries that serve with them and, after an adventurous ﬂight by sea along the coast 
of Britain, are enslaved upon their arrival in Germany (28). A third type, auxiliaries serv-
ing loyally in Agricola’s army, mirror senators like Agricola himself6.
I
Isabelle Künzer (2014) is right to stress that the Usipi excursus requires an explana-
tion. Why would Tacitus interrupt a narrative in honour of his father-in-law to draw 
attention to a mutiny that detracts from Agricola’s achievements? Jörg Daumer dem-
onstrates how Tacitus took pains to downplay both the Germans’ achievement and 
the impact of the rebellion7. Even if the event was well known8, a biographer could 
have omitted it. That Tacitus nevertheless chose to narrate it, in spite of its problematic 
content, points to an important function. However, none of the suggestions made so 
far is suﬃcient to explain the inclusion of the story. A purely literary or narrative func-
tion9 cannot account for the choice of the problematic subject; reader reception may 
be manipulated by diﬀerent means10; and there are other ways of contrasting Agricola’s 
and Domitian’s conquests11. My explanation has the advantage of coherence: it assigns 
the passage an integral role in promoting core ideas of the Agricola, it provides a more 
consistent explanation for peculiarities of the narrative, and it draws on intra-textual 
correspondences much stronger than the repeated use of verba propria12. 
Two features of the Germans’ enterprise stand out in Tacitus’ narrative: failure and 
fame. The same features characterise the deﬁant senators. The desertion of the Usipi is a 
6 Rutledge 2000 distinguishes Britons like Calgacus as representing values of the old (Roman) 
republic from the Britons in Agr. 21 as standing for “decadent imperial culture” (84). Others have seen a 
positive or negative connection between the Usipi and Agricola (e.g. Clarke 2001; see also Künzer 2014) or 
Calgacus and the deﬁant senators (e.g. Lavan 2011, 304).
7 Daumer 2005, 241-244.
8 Steidle 1965. 110; Daumer 2005, 241; Ash 2010.
9 See, e.g., Steidle 1965, 99-100; Ogilvie-Richmond 1967, 245; Ash 2010, 276, 292. 
10 This is Künzer’s (2014) explanation. She is somewhat unclear about where exactly the reception is 
supposed to be directed.
11 Ash 2010, 291-292; Künzer 2014.
12 10.4; 38.3: circumuehi Britanniam: Clarke 2001, 110; Ash 2010, 292; Künzer 2014, 447. The 
repetition could have been intended to ﬂag the contrast between the Germans’ disastrous trip and the 
“triumphal procession of studied leisure” of Agricola’s ﬂeet “displaying the completeness of Roman imperial 
control” (Braund 1996, 171). Künzer (452) also points to rapere in 28.3 and 30.4.
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“great and memorable” facinus, a “deed” – and a “crime”. Even the murder of a Roman 
soldier can be a great deed. From the non-Roman enemy’s perspective, killing a centu-
rion is an achievement; committed by a Roman soldier, it is an abominable crime. It is 
up to the readers which viewpoint they take. A similar ambiguity characterises the acts 
of the deﬁant senators: they commit “forbidden things” (42.4 illicita), which may be 
something wrong – or only something the emperor has outlawed in abuse of his power. 
Whatever the perspective, Tacitus connects the idea of greatness to memory. Like the 
deaths of deﬁant senators, the inconsequential exploit of the Germans derives greatness 
not so much from its results as from the continued remembrance it engenders. They are a 
spectacle rather than bearers of solid glory. The Usipi’s adventure is something extraordi-
nary viewed by astonished spectators, by the readers and observers written into the story. 
What exactly is so extraordinary becomes less and less clear as the narration continues 
and, parallel to this, the Germans appear increasingly passive. When proceeding simulta-
neously by land and by sea, Agricola’s ﬂeet attracts attention (25.1). This is the result of 
a general’s well-considered plan to impress the locals. The Germans also attract attention 
when they sail along the British coast, but in their case it happens to them against their 
will. There is no mention of any such desire, and usually a deserter would prefer to stay 
unnoticed. The event that triggers the observers’ reaction is also an undesired necessity 
for the Germans: they are on ships that they cannot steer. At ﬁrst they determine their 
own movements and grammatically appear as the agent subject of the verbs with which 
their story is told. At the end of the passage, those Usipi who reach Roman territory are 
reduced to passive objects both syntactically and in terms of content: they are handed 
from slave owner to slave owner. Nor do they shine forth among others because of deeds 
they themselves would tell; they are passively illuminated by a spotlight directed at them 
through the impersonal indication of how great a misfortune has befallen them13. 
This anti-climax links the motif of fame with the other main theme of the passage: 
failure14. Tacitus underscores the Germans’ inability to achieve their goal. Their attempt 
to break the Roman yoke ends in slavery much worse than their previous condition. 
Tacitus ampliﬁes their plight by narrating four kinds of adversity: lack of supplies, lack 
of nautical expertise, lack of support by the inhabitants of the British coast, and the 
Usipi’s dubious status among the people of Germany, who treat them as outlaws. None 
of these problems occurs in Cassius Dio’s version. Only in the Agricola do the Usipi 
meet constant opposition. It is also only there that the deserters, however valiant in bat-
tle, are reduced to cannibalism. At this point, the reader glimpses some organisation for 
the ﬁrst time15, but this positive feature only serves to enhance the gruesome detail by 
13 28.3 indicium tanti casus illustrauit. Contrast how in 45.3 Agricola himself has actively attained 
claritas uitae and how the perception of his forma mentis aeterna impresses others.
14 See also Künzer 2014.
15 Not strictly distinguishing between historical fact and narrative, Ash 2010, 283-285 argues that 
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narrating it in two stages: ﬁrst the weakest are eaten; then they draw lots. The Germans 
are unable to make good use of the helmsmen they have kidnapped. Whatever becomes 
of the third who is not immediately killed, they lose all their ships not knowing how 
to steer them (28.3). Tacitus exaggerates the Usipi’s incompetence: after all, they did 
manage to cross the North Sea and reach Germany, and they could not have done this 
holding on to a plank of their sunken vessel. Further repetitions amplify their enslave-
ment in Germany. If we take the narrative literally, they are seized not once but twice: 
“they were captured ﬁrst by the Suebi and soon after by the Frisii.” Tacitus could have 
opted for an expression like “some by the former, the remnant by the other”16, but chose 
not to. The section ends with the pathetic image of slaves who stick out among the other 
human merchandise because of the glamorous story told about them, and yet another 
time the most humiliating fact, that they have become something to be sold and bought, 
is repeated by the author17.
Not only with regard to its ﬂashy greatness paired with futility is the exploit of the 
Usipi reminiscent of the ambitious, useless deaths of the deﬁant senators. In both cases, 
Tacitus acknowledges the splendour of the deed and distinguishes two aspects, intrinsic 
greatness and its external recognition18. Both passages present the external viewpoint of 
an admirer (28.1 ut miraculum – . mirari) and both passages end with words that 
describe fame as some kind of illumination (28.3 illustrauit – 42.4 inclaruerunt). In both 
passages the admiration is partly the result of the observers’ ignorance: the ships with 
the Germans are a miracle only until rumours have spread (28.1); the admirers of deﬁ-
ant senators “should know” that a more substantial form of greatness is possible19. The 
underlying attitude, obstinate insistence on maintaining their freedom, is mentioned of 
the Romans (42.3) and evident in the case of the Usipi. Although they display extraor-
dinary personal courage, even to the degree of self-sacriﬁce, both stand outside their 
community. The Romans pursue personal fame “without any beneﬁt for the common-
wealth” (42.4 in nullum rei publicae usum); the Germans are mutinous murderers – not 
only from a Roman viewpoint: rather than negotiating for supplies and safe conduct 
home, they behave like a band of pirates trying to rob the Britons of their possessions 
and are treated as such when the Britons ﬁght back (28.2) and when other Germans 
enslave them (28.3 pro praedonibus habiti). 
If we ask for the causes of failure, the answer seems to be diﬀerent in each case. The de-
ﬁant senators fail to achieve more than a splendid death because they set themselves such a 
limited aim, while the Usipi have a reasonable purpose: returning home. They fail because 
Tacitus characterises the Usipi as a well-coordinated unit.
16 Ogilvie-Richmond 1967, 249.
17 28.3 per commercia uenumdatos; mutatione ementium.
18 28.1 magnum ac memorabile – 42.3 famam; 42.4 magnos uiros (the phrase includes both types of men).
19 42.4 sciant, emphatically at the beginning of the sentence.
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they do not possess the resources, skills and leadership required for a safe journey and are 
unable to negotiate with other peoples as an organised unit. In this sense, the failure of the 
Usipi does illustrate Roman superiority20. Confronted with this superpower, the peoples 
whom Rome chooses to subject seem to have only two options: slavery or death.
II
The directly following narrative of the battle at Mons Graupius, which at ﬁrst sight 
seems to conﬁrm precisely this idea, in fact showcases a third choice. The auxiliaries in 
Agricola’s army are set oﬀ against the foil of both the ordinary Briton (29.2) and the 
Usipi (28), who reoccur in Calgacus’ speech. Contrary to Calgacus’ assumption that a 
common interest of all provincials will lead the auxiliaries to defect like the Usipi be-
fore them (32.3-4), these men win the battle for Agricola (35.2), while the reader has 
already witnessed the lack of solidarity between Usipi and Britons. It is striking to which 
degree Tacitus underscores the loyalty of auxiliaries and the role they play in Agricola’s 
conquests. The decisive advance at Mons Graupius is made by cohorts of Batavi and 
Tungri (36.1). By explicitly referring to German tribes, Tacitus points to the contrast 
between two types of non-Roman valour and greatness. The newly recruited Usipi reject 
the discipline, leadership and good example personiﬁed by the Roman centurion and 
legionaries whom they kill, and accordingly they fail. Together with their Roman fellow 
soldiers, they are proper Roman maniples; without them they count as lawless pirates 
(28.1, 3). The Batavi, Tungri and other auxiliaries have become successful conquerors 
through experience and military training (36.1 uetustate militiae)21. Following the or-
ders of a competent general, they are safe from foolishly rushing to self-destruction in 
the heat of victory and capable to protect their Roman comrades (37.4; 35.2). These 
men have taken a third option for people subject to Roman power and become part of 
that power themselves. If only they are prepared to subordinate to military discipline, 
they can belong to an army whose uirtus together with the ‘glory of the name “Roman”’, 
which they now share, is the motor of conquest (23). 
Anthony Birley and others misunderstand the import of a claim made in the narra-
tive, that the victory was going to be even more glorious if won without spilling Roman 
blood (35.2). This is not cynical gloating at barbarians killing each other22. We must 
not forget that Tacitus focalises the auxiliaries. The reader looks through their eyes when 
Tacitus uses the preposition citra to say that “the legions stood in front of the rampart, 
as the victory’s supreme decoration of ﬁghting the war on this side (citra) of Roman 
blood, and as an aid should they be driven back (pellerentur)” (35.2). It is only from 
20 Ogilvie-Richmond 1967, 245.
21 See, e.g., Gilliver 1996 and Haynes 2013 for historical background.
22 Birley 1999, 89 and, e.g., Gerlinger 2008, 315-316.
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the standpoint of the auxiliaries that the expression assumes the intended meaning, and 
the focalisation is continued with the omission of a subject with pellerentur: the reader 
must ﬁrst disregard the grammatical subject of the sentence (legiones), mentally place 
the legionaries in the background and then supply the correct subject, the auxiliaries 
about to ﬁght in the battle. The focalisation also determines whose honour it is if the 
battle is won without drawing Roman blood. It is the auxiliaries’ distinction if they do 
not need the support of the legions witnessing their valour and standing ready to help if 
necessary. Calgacus scornfully refers to the fact that Gauls, Germans and many Britons 
“make their blood available to foreign domination” and doubts that they feel any loyalty 
to their masters (32.1). Similar to the reference to deserting auxiliaries and the Usipi 
(32.3), this idea is now inverted by the narrated ‘facts’: risking their blood for their Ro-
man fellow soldiers has become an honour for the provincials serving under Agricola’s 
command. Calgacus’ errors and their ‘correction’ in the following narrative, conﬁrm the 
actual bond between Agricola and his auxiliaries, and the degree to which they are a well 
integrated and loyal part of the army. 
The forces as a whole are portrayed as a harmonious unity. When mixed bands of 
elated soldiers compare their deeds with “military boastfulness” (25.1), diﬀerences cre-
ate a pleasant, colourful picture without disruption. Diversity appears in purely military 
categories – infantry, cavalry or navy – and there is no mention of ethnic background or 
Roman citizenship23. Nor does Tacitus distinguish between Roman legionaries and aux-
iliaries when describing the army conﬁdent in their uirtus and eager to ﬁght (27.1; 33.1). 
Agricola addresses “fellow soldiers” (commilitones) in his pre-battle speech that must have 
been directed, ﬁrst of all, at the auxiliaries about to ﬁght. He calls himself the legatus, the 
emperor’s deputy, and speaks to the “trained army” (exercitus). It will demonstrate “to 
the commonwealth” (rei publicae) that not they were responsible for revolts of the con-
quered or any delays in victory (34.3). Among Agricola’s audience there are also Britons, 
whose outstanding courage and loyalty, demonstrated by their keeping peace for a long 
time, had qualiﬁed them for this expedition (29.2). There is no sign that they resent 
hearing such words. The whole army receives the speech with “extraordinary eagerness” 
(35.1), and this eagerness is borne out by the events of the battle itself, in which Agricola 
must constantly restrain his auxiliaries24. Accordingly, they are called “our men” when 
Tacitus refers to them for the ﬁrst time in the battle description25. With the exception of 
the Usipi, all auxiliary units mentioned in the Agricola are loyal and contribute decisively 
to Agricola’s success. Already his important ﬁrst victory was won by auxiliaries (18.3). 
23 In the Histories Tacitus ominously highlights the linguistic and ethnic diversity of armies ﬁghting 
in the civil war: Ash 1999, 67-69.
24 33.1 laetum et uix munimentis coercitum militem (note also the collective singular, which makes the 
Roman and non-Roman soldiers appear as one single-minded unity); 35.1-2; Agricola takes care that the 
Batavians, who are hurriedly pressing forward (36.2), are not circumvented from the back (37.1; 37.4-5).
25 36.1 missilia nostrorum; Ash 2007, 437.
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Most of all, it is Agricola’s willingness to put his life into the hands of these men that 
speaks against Birley’s reading. Having drawn out the battle line to such a length that 
some admonish him to call in the legions, Agricola shows his conﬁdence in the strength 
and loyalty of his auxiliaries not only by dispensing with further reinforcements but also 
by sending away his horse and taking his stand in front of them (35.5). 
To summarize the results so far: the battle of Mons Graupius together with the Usipi 
excursus serve to contrast three attitudes to Roman rule: the mass of non-Roman people 
resists but loses the ﬁght and becomes subject to domination, whether unjust or just; a 
few will lose their life or relative freedom in daredevil attempts to break free; a third type 
will become part of Roman rule themselves by willingly subordinating themselves to the 
discipline of the Roman army. This discipline restricts their individual freedom but is 
not slavery since these soldiers share the name of Rome and the virtue and glory of the 
victorious Roman army (23). This threefold division corresponds to the three senatorial 
attitudes to the emperor’s rule: the majority may rebel but submits; a few show obstinate 
and spectacular resistance; a third group gains relative freedom of agency as military 
leaders, maintaining the Roman Empire and thus also the rule of the emperor himself. 
Tacitus acknowledges the greatness and fame of both the second and the third group, 
but only the third group attains the solid glory that arises from real success in a serious, 
useful cause. This is service in an army held together by manly valour and its shared 
purpose of promoting the Roman commonwealth (23; 33.1)26.
III
Agricola is a paragon of the third group. His modestia and obsequium are not the 
versatile “self-eﬀacement and adaptability” that “might be associated with a knight like 
Atticus”27, nor are they just “qualities of a senator who recognised the subordinate rôle, 
and who did not see it as part of his duty to challenge authority”28: they are ﬁrst of all 
military virtues29. Towards Domitian, Agricola behaves like an oﬃcer under the com-
mand of a man who is incompetent and morally inferior to him. He respects the other’s 
rank and tries to make the best of the situation, just as he subordinates his talent to 
Vettius Bolanus because he “had experience in obeying (obsequi) and learned how to 
26 Apart from 4.5, where Agricola is fascinated with the vision of a philosopher’s “great and lofty 
glory”, gloria occurs in the Agricola only with reference to military glory (8.2-3, 23.1, 32.1, 33.6, 39.3; 
opposed to survival and safety [salus]: 26.3, 31.5; conjoined with the glory of the Roman name: 23.1; 
Agricola’s glory: 41.2 and 41.4; 44.3; 46.4).
27 Liebeschütz 1966, 130.
28 Shotter 1991, 3270.
29 Lendon 1997, 248 and, more generally, Phang 2008. See also the nuanced discussion in Vielberg 
1987.
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combine what is honourable with what is useful” (8.1), e.g. as Suetonius Paulinus’ tribu-
nus (5), when he served with modesty and vigour. This is not inert slavishness; it is the 
duty of a soldier. For this reason Agricola’s subordination to his commander-in-chief30 
Domitian does not detract from his dignity. He shows the same modestia and obsequium 
which, together with his energy and application (42.4 industria et uigor), had qualiﬁed 
him for his splendid military career.
Since the “virtue of a good military leader is the virtue of an emperor” (39.2), Ag-
ricola’s leadership is a model of conduct for emperors and the army a model for the 
Roman state31. Men with diverse backgrounds and diﬀerent interests rally under a com-
mon banner in the tradition of a powerful hierarchy: they are the exercitus led by a dux 
together with whom they serve the res publica and the nomen Romanum. This common 
submission to an empowering system of military discipline and the orientation toward 
something greater than any individual creates a win-win situation: both leader and sub-
ordinates give up part of their autonomy and, in return, receive their due share of free-
dom to promote not only the “glory of the Roman name” but also their own name to 
earn the glory that they deserve32.
IV
It is evident that these results, if accepted, have consequences for much debated is-
sues such as the genre and purpose of the Agricola or the question to which extent the 
work was written for the new emperor Trajan33. Here, I will close with a few remarks 
on the limitations of the military model as they are displayed in the Agricola already by 
Tacitus himself. 
Firstly, its success requires eﬀective leadership. Lack of leadership characterises the 
non-Roman people in the Agricola34. The revolt under Suetonius Paulinus (15-16.3) 
arises from general dissatisfaction vented in anonymous conversations (15.1-16.1). Only 
after the Britons are ready to ﬁght does Boudicca make a ﬂeeting appearance and im-
mediately disappears again. Successes occur in the passive voice; outrages are committed 
by impersonal “barbarian ire and victory” (16.1). Paulinus deals with several anonymous 
groups diﬀerentiated by their interests, not with Briton leaders35. The Usipi’s misfortunes 
begin when they kill their commander and the helmsmen (18.1). Calgacus is nothing 
30 Vielberg 1987, 47.
31 E.g. Braund 1996, 159. 
32 Sailor 2008, 76-77 sees a similar win-win situation between Cerialis and Agricola. 
33 See, most recently, Geisthardt 2015 and, e.g., Braund 1996, 152-153, 158.
34 Compare Rutledge 2000, 82-83.
35 16.1. The parallel account in the Annals (14.29-39) shows that Tacitus deliberately eﬀaces the role 
of Briton leaders in the Agricola.
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more than a name tacked to a highly topical speech and vanishes as soon as he has spoken 
36. The battle narrative leaves us with the impression that the Britons have no leadership 
whatsoever. No Briton commander makes an appearance, and the nobles, the men in the 
war chariots (couinnarii), give a spectacle of futile disorder, ﬁrst when they ﬁll the plain 
with inconsequential noise and random movements (35.3), the second time when they 
have turned to ﬂight (36.3) without any ﬁghting the reader would be aware of. At the 
end, there are only empty chariots and panicking horses (36.3). The headless behaviour 
of the commoners reﬂects this lack of leadership. Those on the mountain top misjudge 
the danger and begin to partake in the battle only when it is too late (37.1). Their fervour 
causes them to be repelled even more violently (37.1). Well armed, strong contingents 
panic and turn their backs on a small number of Roman soldiers; others throw them-
selves onto the enemy without any defence and have themselves slaughtered (37.3). They 
disperse and hide in the wilderness, each man caring only for himself (37.5). Agitated 
by mixed emotions, they burn their own houses and do one thing and then the opposite 
(38.1). Finally, the reader witnesses how they slaughter – not themselves but their wives 
and children “as if they were having mercy with them” (38.1). 
The Romans have a command structure that helps them win their battles against the 
Britons. But what if the Roman commander is a bad leader? The short history of Roman 
conquest in Britain parades diﬀerent governors as examples of the beneﬁcial or detri-
mental eﬀects of certain types of leadership. It also illustrates the connection between 
good leadership in the provinces and the emperor: one of the worst governors, Trebel-
lius Maximus, rules during the civil war (16.3), and as soon as Vespasian has become 
emperor, there are “great leaders, excellent armies and very little hope for the enemy” 
(17.1; see also 13.3). The contrast ﬁgure is Domitian, “a ﬁerce enemy of all excellence” 
(41.1 infensus uirtutibus), whose negative characterisation, more than anything else in 
the Agricola, highlights the limits of the military model. In Tacitus’ portrayal, Domitian 
must fake a military success (39.1) and fears that “the name of a private citizen be raised 
above that of the emperor” (39.2). It is important to note that these two points are made 
not in Tacitus’ authorial voice but in indirect speech, as thoughts of Domitian himself37. 
The fundamental problem is not so much that the emperor is not also a good military 
commander but rather that he is incapable of seeing himself as Agricola’s superior in a 
military hierarchy. For him, Agricola is priuatus, a civilian subject to his rule, not his 
deputy (legatus). Since he does not regard himself as a commander (dux), he cannot 
conceive of Agricola as his soldier (miles). Nor does Domitian understand that if he 
would behave like a real imperator, the glory of his subordinates would be his to share 
36 Ash 2007, 436.
37 Lendon 1997, 108-109 quotes this passage as an example of the emperor’s competition for 
“conventional honour of Graeco-Roman aristocrats”. When discussing honour in the Roman army, however, 
he also refers to soldiers’ “concern for the praise of their superiors” (260). There honour is enhanced when 
personally conferred by a superior. 
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with them to the degree he sees ﬁt38. As a result he cannot avail himself of a loyal fol-
lower’s services, but wishes him dead and endangers the success of the Roman military 
system by preferring incompetent commanders that cause defeats and the death of true 
“military men” (uiri militares) serving under them (41.2)39. 
Another problem for the military model is its limited transferability to the civilian 
sphere. Vielberg highlights the discrepancy between Agricola’s energetic, active military 
life and his passivity in politics40. We never encounter Agricola in the senate or as an ad-
visor at court; upon his return from Britain, he is received by Domitian without a word 
and, after a perfunctory kiss, sent away to blend with the other servants (40.3); Agricola 
is so inconspicuous that people ask themselves whether this really is the famous general 
(40.4). Whereas it was a tradition to accept inequality in the ﬁeld, the civilian life of 
the senatorial class promoted an ideal of equality41. In the Agricola, Tacitus not only 
denounces the suppression of military ambitions by the emperor, there is also a strand 
of references to the indiﬀerence, rejection and envy with which military men are met by 
“the times”42. This refers to the successful commanders’ peers, while the common crowd 
(uulgus) desires another command for Agricola (41.3; 43.1). The monarchic rule of the 
emperor-commander is as problematic in the civilian sphere as a ﬁxed internal hierarchy 
within a peer group of men supposed to be equals.
What is more, in the civilian sphere obsequium may become morally “disﬁgured”43. 
Nowhere in the Agricola do we ﬁnd an indication that obeying his commanders would 
ever have brought Agricola into moral conﬂict. Even under a corrupt governor (6.2), a 
weak general (8.1) and an emperor like Domitian, his integrity is never compromised. 
However, after he has returned to the life of a civilian in Rome, it is only his death that 
saves him from involvement in the crimes that taint Tacitus and his fellow senators 
when they are forced not only to watch but actively participate in the incarceration and 
murder of their peers (44.4).
38 5.3; 8.2; 22.4; Braund 1996, 173.
39 On Agricola’s loyalty to Domitian, see Vielberg 1987, 39.
40 Vielberg 1987, 40-42. 
41 Lendon 1997 argues that the army was an exception to the rule that following someone else’s orders 
was perceived as degrading and slavish (18-21) and that, in late antiquity, imperial service was assimilated 
to military service since “it was especially under military discipline that aristocrats could obey one another 
without loss of face” (21).
42 1.1; 1.4; 5.3; 9.2; 40.4; 41.4; 42.1; Geisthardt 2015, 47-55.
43 Ann. 4.20.3 deforme obsequium; Heldmann 1991.
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